Introduction
In this paper we shall take an n-person game (3, 9), denoted (I, , v), to be a set I, of n > 2 elements, the players, and a real-valued set function v, called the characteristic function, having the properties for all i r I, is called an imputation of the game; it is interpreted as a possible set of payments to the players. The term coalition is used for any non-empty set of players (who are thought to cooperate in the playing of the game); any proper partition of I, will be called a coalition structure.
The symbols I, , v, X, xi with and without primes will be used throughout with the above meanings. S and T will denoted subsets of I, and T a coalition structure. The number of elements in a set T is denoted by 1 T I . ' I am indebted to the referee for a number of valuable suggestions which led to a significant revision of Section 3. I also wish to thank Mr. Josiah Macy, Jr. for his critical discussions of the work. suitable requirements, in terms of v, on the class of all imputations in order to isolate a subclass of "acceptable" ones, where the criteria on acceptable are, a t best, vague. Several studies in this vein have been published, among them von Neumann and Morgenstern's "solutions" (9, p. 246), Milnor's "reasonable outcomes" (5), Shapley's "value" (6) , and his "G-stable sets" (8) . We shall begin yet another which is an attempt "To study n-person games with restrictions imposed on the forming of coalitions, thus recognizing that the cost of communication among the players during the pregame coalition-forming period is not negligible but rather, in the typical economic model with large n, is likely to be the dominating con~ideration."~
COMMENT. I t is plausible to suppose that an imputation, i.e., a particular set of payments, will occur in the presence of a coalition only if that coalition receives a total payment at least as large as the smallest payment it need ever accept, hence the definition. DEFINITION 2. If T is a coalition structure and k a non-negative integer, then any set ( T u K ) -H , where T E T, H c T, K c -T, and
COMMENT. In this definition me are considering the possibility of revising a coalition structure when there is a limitation on the degree of change that can occur. If we take this number to be k, and T is a coalition under consideration, then the total number of players added to T, 1 K 1 , plus the total number expelled from T, I H I , must not exceed k. I t should be noted that the 0-critical coalitions of T are the elements of T itself. DEFINITION 3. Let k be an integer such that 1 5 k S n -2. A pair (X, T) is k-stable if every k-critical coalition of T is X-admissible and if v({i] ) < xi for all i E T such that T E T and I T I > 1. A game is k-stable if there is a t least one k-stable pair for the game, otherwise it is called k-unstable.
COMMENT. For a pair to be k-stable we require that there be no positive gain assured any of the conceivable coalitions which could be formed from T within the rnaximum allowable changes, in the sense of Definition 2. Further, we suppose that an individual will not trouble to participate in a non-trivial coalition unless he is assured more than he could obtain alone. The latter requirement is used only in Theorem 5, where it serves to restrict the number of 1-stable pairs. COMMENT. For zero-sum games McKinsey (4) has shown S-equivalence is a suitable formulation of the intuitive concept "strategic equivalence."
Reference 2, p. xi. The editors of this book have listed 14 topics which they feel should be considered in the future development of game theory; I have quoted, in part, the ninth listing.
The constants c and ai in Definition 4 are unique if the games are essential, for if c' and a: are another set, then for any coalition T and i E -T, Subtracting the last two equations from the first, we have
and so by a simple induction ~( 1 , ) = xiern ~( ( i } ) .
Thus, (I, , v) is inessential or c = c'. If the latter, it follows from the third equation that a, = a: , and so the constants are unique if the game is essential. In footnote 5 me shall give explicit formulas for the constants. THEOREM 1. TWO S-equivalent games are either both k-stable or both k-unstable.
PROOF. Suppose (X, T) is a k-stable pair of (I, , v) and that (I, , v') is Sequivalent to (I,, v), with the constants c and a , , then we show that
If T E and I T I > 1 a n d i E T, THEOREM 2. Let k and k' be positive infegers with k < k'. If a game is kf-stable i t is k-stable and if it is k-unstable i t is kf-unstable. PROOF. Trivial. The paper consists of three parts. In the next section me show that all (n -2)-stable constant-sum games are inessential and this is used to determine all kstable 3-and 4-person constant-sum games. In Section 3 we generalize the concept of a simple game and characterize the k-stable simple games. Using this it is shown that the theory of 1-unstable simple games is identical to the theory of 1-unstable 3-person simple games, and it is an immediate consequence that there exist k-unstable games for all n and all k I n -2. The 1-stable pairs of a simple game are displayed, which is of some interest since it presents some of the phenomena encompassed by the definition. In the final section we present a class of games which are k-stable for all k, 1 S k 5 n -2.
k-Stable 3-and 4-Person Constant-Sum Games
THEOREM 3. Any (n -2)-stable constant-sum game is inessential.
PROOF. Suppose (X, T) is an (n -2)-stable pair of (I, , v). For any T E r and j E -T, I -T -( j } I 5 n -2, so, using the (n -2)-stability and constant-sum assumptions,
and the game is inessential. This theorem is not generally true as the following non-constant-sum game shows.
The pair ( 11 2, -1, -1 11, [ [ I ) , (21, (311) is 1-stable in this game. Furthermore, even if the constant-sum assumption is retained, the theorem cannot be extended to k < n -2, as the following example shows.
when I T I = n -1 all other values.
1'
The addition of n -3 or fewer elements to any coalition of the pair ( 11 0, 0, . . . 0 11, [ ( I ) , [ 2 ) , . . . {n)]), i.e. to any element, results in a set T having a t most n -2 members, so v(T) 5 0 = C a T xi . Thus, the pair is
It is immediate from Theorem 3 that there are no essential 1-stable 3-person constant-sum games, nor any 2-stable constant-sum 4-person games. The possibility of essential 1-stable constant-sum 4-person games remains; we shall give the 1-stable pairs for the reduced (~(1,) = 0 and v({i)) = -1) cases. The essential reduced constant-sum 4-person games may be shown to be of the following form (9, p. 291):
By a simple exhaustive examination of cases, the following (X, T ) pairs may be shown t o be the only 1-stable ones. The referee has pointed out that Q is the "quota" defined by Shapley (7) and that i t is easy to show that in any quota game without a weak player (Q, I t is clear that in any game a subset of a losing coalition is losing, that a superset of a winning coalition is winning, that any one element coalition is losing, and that if T is winning -T is losing. I t is not true, in general, that if T is losing -T is winning. This property, which in effect was the defining property used by von Neumann and Morgenstern for simple zero-sum games, holds in a simple game, as we have defined it, if and only if it is constant-sum.
Simple Games
If T is a losing coalition, m(T) = 0 4 x z c T pz , SO it is clear that the first condition of stability is met by a k-critical losing coalition. If T is winning, m(T) = 1 2 CzcT pi . Thus, if T is k-critical and winning and if the conditions of stability are met, the equality must hold, so p, = 0 for all i e -T; and if p, > 0 for i e -T, the conditions for k-stability are violated. THEOREM 4. A suficient condition for a game to be k-unstable, which for szmple games is also a necessary condition, is that there exists a (k + 1)-element winning coalztion and the intersection of all (k + 1)-element winning coalztions is vacuous.
PROOF. Let S1 , Sz , . . . S, be the set of (k + 1)-element winning coalitions and suppose (P, T) is a k-stable pair, where 7 = (TI , Tz , . . . Tt). If S , intersects two elements of T, say T, and T, , then both T, u S, and T, u S, are winning and k-critical, so m(Tq u 8,) = 1 = ~, , T~~S , p, = m(Tr u S , ) = C3cTrUs, p 3 .
Xow, suppose that there is a e Tq-S, such that p, > 0. Since Tq n T, = 0, a 6 T, -S, , so CIcT,USE p3 < 1, which is impossible. Thus, we have C,,s, p3 = 1. If, however, S , CI T, , then x , a s , p3 = 1 except possibly if T, -S, Z 0.
Suppose there is d E T, -S , such that p, > 0. Observe that T, -( a ) 3 S , is winning and k-critical for every k, so we obtain the contradiction m(T, -( a ) ) = 1 > 1 -p, = x 3 c T , p3 -pa = x 3 c T , -( s ) p3 . B U~ 8% was any of the winning coalitions, so we obtain the absurdity 0 = C,,,,s,=o p, = 1, and thus we must conclude that the game is k-unstable. PROOF. A 4-person constant-sum game is simple if and only if y, = & l , and so there are always three 2-element winning coalitions. If the game is 1-stable it follows from corollary 1 that these coalitions have a common element, hence the first assertion. I t is readily verified that this is equivalent to the assertion that one or three of the y, = 1. Of the 1-stable pairs, case iii obviously cannot occur and case ii is eliminated by the condition -1 < yl < 1, which violates the assumption that the game is simple. , ( 2 ) , . . . , ( s } , T), so condition b.2 is met. We turn to condition b.1. Since T is winning, I T I > 1, so for any i e T, pi > 0. Thus, T -{i} must be a losing coalition. By assumption, {i, j}, i E -T and j E I,, , is not winning, so condition b.1 is met. We may, therefore, assume every T e T is a losing coalition. I t is clear that if T u (i) is a losing coalition for every T e T and i E -T then condition a is met, so we assume that for some T and some i E -T, T u (i) is a winning coalition. I t then follows that p j = 0 for j e -(T u { i } ) and so there are no coalitions in -T aside from single elements, hence condition b.2 is met. I t follows immediately that b.1 is also met. PROOF. Suppose (In , m) is I-unstable and simple, then by Theorem 4 we know that there exist a t least two 2-element winning coalitions. Let L be the intersection of the complements of all 2-element winning coalitions. For n > 3, L f 0, for if it were empty then the set of all 2-element winning coalitions would span I, , which coupled with the fact that their intersection is vacuous implies, for n 2 4, there are two, S and T, without a common element. Thus, -S is a losing coalition since S is winning, but since T C -S, -S is winning, a contradiction.
Suppose (I,
Let T be a losing coalition, we show T u L is also losing. This is trivial if T c L, so we suppose T -L f 0. If there is a winning coalition {i, jJ such that i, j E -(T u L), then since -{i, j] is losing, T u L is losing. We may therefore suppose every winning %element coalition is of the form {i, j ) with i E -(T u L) and j E T -L. Furthermore, for every such i there exists a j E T -L, and for every such j there exists an i e -(T u L), such that {i, j} is winning, otherwise L does not have the maximal property of its definition. I n order that all 2-element winning coalitions do not have a common element, it is necessary that 1 -(T u L) ) 2 2 and / T -L I 2 2. Thus, the 2-element winning coalitions span the 4 or more elements in -L and, as above, it follows there are two without a common element, and the same contradiction results. Thus, T u L is losing and so for any i E L, m(T u ( i ) ) = m(T) if T is losing. The same equation holds if T is winning since T u ( i ) is also winning. I t therefore follows easily that for any T,
and so i is a dummy.
The game on -( i ] is also 1-unstable for by the choice of i all 2-element winning coalitions remain, so by a repeated induction we may isolate and remove dummies until n = 3. Thus, (I, , m) is decomposable into a 1-unstable simple is a simple game, formed by adding a dummy to (I,-* , m), which has exactly the same 2-element winning coalitions as (Inv1 , m); hence, it is 1-unstable by Theorem 4. COROLLARY 1. Every simple non-constant-sum game is 1-stable, and every simple constant-sum game is 1-stable except those which are decomposable into the 3-person constant-sum game and an inessential game.
PROOF. This follows immediately from the theorem provided that a decomposable game is constant-sum if and only if its components are constant-sum. This is readily verified from Definition 6. COROLLARY 2. For every n >= 3 and k , 1 5 k 5 n -2, there exists a k-unstable (simple and constant-sum) game.
PROOF. By Theorem 2 it is sufficient to show this for k = 1, and this has been done in Theorem 6.
The result of Theorem 6-the decomposition of a 1-unstable game into a 3-person game and an inessential game-does not hold in general for non-simple games, as the following example shows. Consider the 4-person constant-sum game in which yl = yz = 1, y3 = 0. Then Q = 11 0, 0, -2, 2 11 is not an imputation, so the game is 1-unstable by the results of Section 2. PROOF. We shall prove the slightly stroiiger statement that there exist distributions P such that for every coalition structure T and integer k, 1 4 k 5 n -2 , ( P , T ) is a k-stable pair. Let a , = min,,,5,n [ l / n -m(T)/ 1 T I]. Let P satisfy pi 2 l / n -a , and pa > 0. Such a distribution exists, e.g. p, = l / n , since the game is negative and so a , 2 0. Let 6(T) = max,,, a , . Then, Thus, the pair is k-stable since T is arbitrary. COROLLARY. A negative game i s not constant-sum PROOF. Theorem 7 and Theorem 3.
